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BOOKS RECEIVED
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RACE AND COLOR:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGING THE RACIAL
DISCOURSE
A review of Color Conscious: The Political Morality of
Race, by K. Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann. Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. 191.
Hardcover.
Thuy N. Bui"
"Racial injustice may be the most morally and intellectu-
ally vexing problem in the public life of this country. How
should we respond?"' In their recent book, Color Conscious:
The Political Morality of Race, Amy Gutmann and Kwame
Anthony Appiah tackle this century-old "problem of the color
line"F-to borrow W.E.B. Du Bois' words-in a fresh and pro-
vocative manner, proposing answers concrete enough to lay
the foundation for a new racial discourse, yet sufficiently vi-
sionary to anticipate its many changing facets. Appiah's es-
say, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections, be-
gins with an in-depth analysis of historical thoughts on race
to illustrate why the current concept of race fails to ade-
quately explain social distinctions in the United States, and
ends by offering the concept of "racial identity" as the basis
for a more productive discourse, one that "can be the basis of
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of California at San Diego 1991, J.D. Santa Clara University School of Law
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resistance to racism"' by allowing for the redefinition of per-
sonal and collective identities. Gutmann's essay, Responding
to Racial Injustice, responds to existing social inequities by
insisting that fairness demands color conscious public poli-
cies when class conscious policies and color blindness fail to
correct racial injustice. In making her arguments, Gutmann
distinguishes between race consciousness and color con-
sciousness, suggesting similar problems with the concept of
race as raised by Appiah, and offers that color consciousness
is morally correct because it is consistent with the color blind
principle of fairness.4 What makes this book a unique and
invaluable addition to racial discourse is, first, the authors'
visionary and well-reasoned explorations of the moral and
political significance of race, and, second, the collective value
of the two essays as they intertwine and interact in the
reader's mind to produce even richer possibilities of how we
all might re-address these shared concerns. The introduction
by David B. Wilkins also provides a helpful context upon
which the reader can begin his or her own discourse with the
authors.5 This review briefly assesses each author's contri-
bution to racial discourse through these particular essays,
and outlines an array of practical applications of their vi-
sions.
Racial Identity As the Basis of Resistance to Racism
From the outset, Appiah challenges current racial dis-
course by tackling the concept of race head-on: "American
social distinctions cannot be understood in terms of the con-
cept of race: the only human race in the United States ... is
the human race."6 Of course, this direct and controversial
approach is not surprising. A prominent participant in the
debate over the definitional, moral, political, and social sig-
nificance of race, Appiah has written extensively on the topic,
critiquing the social processes behind racial designation of
3. K. Anthony Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connec-
tions, in K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE
POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 30, 104 (1996) [hereinafter Appiah, Race, Cul-
ture, Identity].
4. Gutmann, supra note 1, at 112-14, 173.
5. David B. Wilkins, Introduction: The Context of Race, in K. ANTHONY
APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF
RACE 3 (1996).
6. Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity, supra note 3, at 32.
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groups and offering controversial alternatives to the concept
of race.7 Consistent with his past works, Appiah reinforces in
Color Conscious the rejection of essential and biological con-
ceptions of race for their failure to explain American social
distinctions among individuals and groups.' In an interest-
ing shift from his prior proposal that we replace the notion of
race with the notion of culture,9 however, Appiah suggests
here that "replacing the notion of race with the notion of cul-
ture is not helpful," for "the American social distinctions that
are marked using racial vocabulary do not correspond to cul-
tural groups, either." ° Rather, Appiah offers a new proposal,
"that, for analytical purposes, we should use instead the no-
tion of a racial identity.""
Notably, Appiah spends a considerable portion of his es-
say in an analysis against the existence of races before ex-
plaining racial identity. Comprehensive and profound, Ap-
piah examines two theories of meaning to illustrate the
inadequacies of race thinking. One, the "ideational" view of
race, accounts for the meaning of the term "race" by laying a
set of rules for applying that term. 2 The second, the
"referential" account of race, is explained as a causal theory:
"if you want to know what object a word refers to, find the
thing in the world that gives the best causal explanation of
the central features of uses of that word."" The difference
between the two, Appiah explains, is that the referential
view, as a causal theory, requires an historical exploration of
the meaning of race that the ideational view does not.'4
Since "exploring the history of the term is central to un-
derstanding what it means," Appiah does just that and dives
into the history of the ideas of some intellectual elites in the
United States, from Thomas Jefferson to Matthew Arnold."
7. See, e.g., the collection of essays in KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY
FATHER'S HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURES (1992) [hereinafter
APPIAH, IN MY FATHER'S HOUSE].
8. Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity, supra note 3, at 30-74.
9. Appiah's essays from In My Father's House suggested using the term
culture rather than race to overcome the problems of biological and essential
conceptions of race. APPIAH, IN MY FATHER'S HOUSE, supra note 7.
10. Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity, supra note 3, at 32.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 34.
13. Id. at 39.
14. Id. at 40-41.
15. Id. at 40-67.
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This exploration results in a thorough account of how race
evolved into biological and scientific conceptions of differ-
ences among human beings. By revealing the falsity of these
conceptions, Appiah leads us to a persuasive conclusion that
neither the ideational nor referential accounts of race satis-
factorily explains social distinctions. On the ideational view,
race was supposed to show the "correlation between the bio-
logical and the moral, literary, or psychological characters of
humans," which "has turned out not to be true."8 On the ref-
erential view, two possible race concepts exist, neither of
which is particularly helpful in racial discourse. The first is
the idea of biological races, roughly amounting to calling as
"races" different local populations that are clustered and re-
productively isolated from each other, with biological differ-
entiations, but still are sufficiently similar to inter-breed if
brought together artificially. 7 Appiah rejects this concept,
correctly pointing out that "this doesn't happen in human
beings,"18 and it certainly does not define "racial" groups in
the United States. The second potential concept of race from
the referential view would define groups by general physical
characteristics corresponding to dominant patterns for the
major geographical regions. 9 This Appiah rejects as prob-
lematic for failure to include individuals who are the product
of mixtures between the dominant groups. Moreover, the use
of biological characteristics to define groups fails to establish
any correlation with group characteristics that are important
for moral or social life, which lie at the heart of the racial dis-
course.20
The bottom line is this: you can't get much of a race con-
cept, ideationally speaking, from any of these traditions;
you can get various possible candidates from the referen-
tial notion of meaning, but none of them will be much good
for explaining social or psychological life, and none of
them corresponds to the social groups we call "races" in
America.2'
Thus, racial identity proves a useful notion because it
explains not that there are differences between people, but
16. Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity, supra note 3, at 71.
17. Id. at 73.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 74.
21. Id.
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that there are distinctions made between people which carry
a social and personal impact. "Once a racial label is applied
to individuals, ideas about what it refers to... come to have
their social effects,"" hence social distinctions between
groups are reinforced and perpetuated. But these labels also
shape "identification," the ways in which people conceive of
themselves. 3 Racial labels ascribe to individuals "scripts"
which they individually perform, having shaped themselves
largely on the identity given to them." The idea of racial
identity as "scripts," or socially constructed "collective identi-
ties,"25 therefore, carries significance for racial discourse:
the persistence of racism means that racial ascriptions
have negative consequences for some and positive conse-
quences for others-creating, in particular, the white-skin
privilege that it is so easy for people who have it to forget;
and it is clear, too, that for those who suffer from the
negative consequences, racial identification is a predict-
able response, especially where the project it suggests is
that the victims of racism should join together to resist
it.'
6
That ascription-the process of applying labels to peo-
ple-and the resulting identification can exist no matter how
we choose to label people suggests that racial identities could
persist even if nobody believed in race as essential differ-
ences between people." We might then think of racism as
the positive and negative consequences resulting from social
distinctions made on arbitrary group identities.
This is perhaps Appiah's greatest contribution to the ra-
cial discourse in this particular essay. By revealing the fal-
sity of race conceptions, Appiah has liberated us from a de-
pendence on any particular definition of race. Instead, we
can focus on the social repercussions of group identities with-
out losing sight of the fact that each individual is comprised
of both a collective and a personal dimension. 8 The collective
dimension is the involuntary membership in some social
category that may not have static or noncontradicted defini-
22. Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity, supra note 3, at 78.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 78-96.
25. Id. at 96.
26. Id. at 82-83.
27. Id. at 82.
28. Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity, supra note 3, at 93.
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tions (such as race), and the personal dimension allows us to
choose how central that membership is to our self-
identification.
Responding to racial injustice, then, means doing some-
thing about the unfair negative consequences of racial ascrip-
tions. While Appiah recognizes that "one form of healing" for
members of disadvantaged groups has been to "insist on the
right to live a dignified life" despite the negative limitations
socially ascribed to that group, he points out that this re-
sponse reinforces the very limitations of those old "life
scripts." 9 When a black person insists on being treated with
equal dignity despite his being black, for example, he has
made concessions that "being black counts naturally or to
some degree against (his) dignity," and will therefore end up
asking to be respected "as a black," rather than as a human
being. ° The more fruitful response is, Appiah argues, "to
take the collective identity and construct positive life scripts
instead."3'
This push for taking steps beyond merely celebrating the
difference between individuals may be deemed by some as
"waging the battle too fiercely," of which Appiah has been ac-
cused in the past.32  Yet Appiah's proposal makes perfect
sense if one thinks of it as attacking the problem of racism at
its roots-that is, changing how people perceive and conceive
of particular "races," or, more accurately, racial identities.
Rather than simply celebrating my difference as an Asian,
proclaim my pride in being Asian (although there are unde-
niable values in doing this)-in doing so implicitly conceding
that I am limited to being Asian-I can take the next step
toward changing what it means to be Asian in America and
actively construct my collective identity, not accepting the
Asian-American "life script" handed to me if I so choose. In
invoking the autonomy of our personal dimensions, Appiah
envisions us combating racism without letting "racial identi-
29. Id. at 98.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology of Race, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 747, 754 (1994). Lee argues that the abandonment of the term race and
all biological and essential conceptions of race invites "reactionary appropria-
tion" of Appiah's arguments, as well as depriving the antiracist necessary flexi-
bility in confronting racism. Id.
[Vol. 38634
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ties subject us to new tyrannies,"" without letting our ethno-
racial identities become "the be-all and end-all" of our lives.'
So it is toward this "fruitful imaginative work of con-
structing collective identities for a democratic nation" that
Appiah looks, leaving the reader with only one reminder of
his vision: "the identities we need will have to recognize both
the centrality of difference within human identity and the
fundamental moral unity of humanity."" How we are differ-
ent matters, but not any more than how we are alike, which
morally guarantees us equality.
The Importance and Utility of the Distinction Between Race
Consciousness and Color Consciousness
Gutmann's own words best explain her proposal to re-
place race consciousness with color consciousness in public
policy considerations:
In considering the value of color consciousness, we would
do well to distinguish it from race consciousness. Race
consciousness assumes that racial identity is a scientifi-
cally based fact of differentiation among individuals that
has morally relevant implications for public policy. Color
consciousness rejects this idea of racial identity. But color
consciousness recognizes the ways in which skin color and
other super-ficial features of individuals adversely and un-
fairly affect their life chances. What's right about color
consciousness.., is also the partial truth in color blind-
ness: all human beings regardless of their color should be
treated as free and equal beings, worthy of the same set of
basic liberties and opportunities.36
The unmistakable focus here is fairness: justice as fair-
ness requires not only that society responds to racial injus-
tice, but that the response itself be fair. To the extent that
"the moral case for responding to racial injustice does not
rest on disproving the idea that there are separate human
races," 7 Gutmann moves away from definitional arguments
on race altogether and concentrates on the unjust impact of
discrimination on the basis of skin color: "Because a child's
life chances in the United States today vary with his or her
33. Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity, supra note 3, at 104.
34. Id. at 103.
35. Id. at 105.
36. Gutmann, supra note 1, at 112.
37. Id. at 114.
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color, even after controlling for other factors ... fairness it-
self may call for color conscious policies." 8 Thus, "to respond
to racial injustice with a color conscious principle or policy is
therefore not to commit any wrong at all, provided the prin-
ciple or policy is consistent with fairness."39
Gutmann cautions, however, that "fairness does
not... call only or even primarily for color conscious poli-
cies," since not all such policies are right.40  She points out
that many economic and educational policies, such as a policy
which ensures work for all those who can work, are color
blind and consistent with fairness. 1 Even color blind deter-
minations, however, cannot be made without some degree of
color consciousness if society is to be fair. For example, a so-
cial program aiming at providing work for all able adults, re-
gardless of color, would still need to be color conscious in de-
termining the kind of work that is beneficial to society,
otherwise special needs of those who have suffered the effects
of racial discrimination may be ignored.4'  Given that our
current society is not a just one, Gutmann argues that some
degree of color consciousness is necessary for the color blind
principle of fairness to truly be fair.
This point may be seen in the reverse if one recalls
Stephanie Wildman's discussion of how invisible privilege
perpetuates racial injustice in America. Wildman writes at
length about the inherent value assumptions behind well-
meaning policies and well-meaning people which inadver-
tently promote racism because they reflect perspectives so
pervasive that their unfairness is difficult to discern, even by
those who suffer the negative consequences of such value as-
sumptions.3 The same logic reveals that color blind policies
can contain inherent value assumptions of the majority, often
to the detriment of the minority, such that implementing
color blind policies without taking this kind of imbalance into
account cannot result in fair outcomes. Since public policies
aim at fairness, there is no set requirement that public poli-
cies be color blind, so long as they are fair: "If we need not be
38. Id. at 110.
39. Id. at 109.
40. Id. at 109, 112.
41. Id. at 110.
42. Gutmann, supra note 1, at 110.
43. See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How IN-
VISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996).
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color blind, then we may be color conscious."" In invoking
fairness as a justification for color consciousness, even as she
advocates a new approach toward the problems of race, Gut-
mann's arguments are reminiscent of Justice Blackmun's
famous words from twenty years ago, "In order to get beyond
racism we must first take account of race. There is no other
way .... And in order to treat people equally, we must treat
them differently.45
How should we treat people differently is the next ques-
tion into which Gutmann dives, paying attention in particu-
lar to arguments for class consciousness. While recognizing
the advantages of class conscious policies (color blind, not
constitutionally suspect, etc.), Gutmann points out that class
consciousness only responds to economic injustice, not racial
injustice. Moreover, the same evidence used to support class
conscious policies also supports color conscious policies. Av-
erage SAT scores, for example, show a 196-point gap between
all black and white students that narrows only by 21 points
when black and white students of the same income level were
considered."' Both income and racial/ethnic background can
be said, then, to impact SAT performance. "Why, then, shift
from color to class, rather than use both class and color, as
independently important considerations in university admis-
sions?"47 For Gutmann, "fairness speaks in favor of taking
both class and color into account as qualifications." 8
Of the many complex questions Gutmann raises, perhaps
the most persuasively difficult one is whether distinguishing
color consciousness from race consciousness actually does
anything to combat racial injustice. Gutmann attacks this
question by explicitly raising the problem with color con-
44. Gutmann, supra note 1, at 132. Gutmann examines this question of
whether public policy must be color blind in much greater depth than my com-
ment suggests. She uses the Piscataway case to illustrate that qualification
does not equal merit in employment, hence no injustice is done if one loses a job
for which one qualifies. Id. "Why? Qualifications for a job are relative to the
social purposes of a job," and those social purposes may extend to a range of
qualifications that are not quantifiable. Id. at 120, 118-138. In this light, em-
ployers are not morally bound to color blindness, but rather to fairness, or non-
discrimination.
45. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407
(1978).
46. Gutmann, supra note 1, at 140-141.
47. Id. at 143.
48. Id. at 146.
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sciousness-"the involuntary nature of the group identity."49
Conceding that "we can neither reflectively choose our color
identity nor downplay its social significance simply by willing
it to be unimportant," Gutmann likens color to language in
the involuntaristic nature of both: "We no more choose our
color than choose the language by which we communicate."0
She then dismisses the significance of the involuntary nature
of both:
But our color no more binds us to send a predetermined
group message to our fellow human beings than our lan-
guage binds us to convey predetermined thoughts. Both
color consciousness and linguistic consciousness offer us
significant degrees of freedom to shape the messages that
we send, even if we cannot escape the consciousness it-
self.5'
Can the same not be said for race consciousness? Can
one not argue that our race no more binds us to a predeter-
mined life or predetermined beliefs and characteristics than
our language binds us to predetermined thought? Gutmann's
prior discussions suggest that one can make a convincing
case that race may indeed bind some to a predetermined life,
or at least affect life chances in such a way that those
"degrees of freedom to shape" life are no longer significant.
The fact that a group identity is involuntary is thus not
morally problematic for Gutmann, but the use of race as
group identity is troubling because "it is a fiction parading or
function as fact." Color consciousness is "neither a fiction pa-
rading as fact nor as likely to divide us in the cause of social
justice." Replacing race consciousness with color conscious-
ness, then, reflects more than a symbolic change:
By calling our attention to the superficiality of skin color
(and facial features) as a continuing source of social differ-
entiation, color consciousness helps expose in its very ter-
minology the idea that race is a fiction and an ongoing
source of social injustice.52
It is still not clear, however, whether exposing the fiction
of race will end racism. Gutmann herself points out that so-
cially constructed cultures can support a group psychology
49. Id. at 168.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Gutmann, supra note 1, at 169.
638 [Vol. 38
BOOKS RECEIVED
that results in members of particular groups discriminating
against others out of a self-ascribed sense of superiority.53
Group identity by color or race can support the same superior
group psychology-would the notion that white is more beau-
tiful than black change simply because we refer to color and
not race? Might we end up with honey-colored skin being
preferred over darker caramel skin? Will color break indi-
viduals into a created number of groups by shades, and will
this change racism at all? Color consciousness certainly does
move the racial discourse forward by removing the need for
definitional arguments on race, and by questioning the le-
gitimacy of race as group identity. Patricia Williams once
commented: "Categorizing is not the sin; the problem is the
lack of desire to examine the categorizations that are
made." ' By exposing the problems with using race to re-
spond to racism, Gutmann has proposed a new language with
which we can discuss the social injustice of group discrimina-
tion on the basis of color. More importantly, Gutmann gives
us a means with which to embrace justice as fairness without
abandoning color consciousness: "What's right about color
consciousness is also the truth about color blindness, and vice
versa."55 Focused on a vision of a just society, Gutmann
leaves us with the thought of racism as temporary: "When
color conscious policies are no longer instrumental to over-
coming racial injustice, our political morality should prepare
us to leave these policies behind.""
On the Intersection of Ideas
Although the two essays present very different styles
and ideas in discussing the problems of race, Gutmann and
Appiah raise some common concerns that allow their essays
to reinforce and expand upon each other's points. Rarely,
however, do they make explicit references or responses to
each other's works. The intersection of ideas happens almost
incidentally, never accidentally, and always provocatively in
prodding the reader to interact and contribute his or her own
perceptions in interpreting links between the suggested
53. Id. at 164-165.
54. Patricia J. Williams, The Obliging Shell (an informal essay on formal
equal opportunity), in THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 98, 102 (1991).
55. Gutmann, supra note 1, at 177.
56. Id.
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thoughts.
One example is the interplay between Appiah's insistent
distinction between cultures and identities 7 and Gutmann's
"decoupling of color and culture." 8 Appiah evokes for the
reader an image of multicultural America, a nation with
"many common cultures"59 rather than a single "coherent
structure of beliefs and values and practices." ° In this light,
racial identity is different from cultural identity because ra-
cial identity does not require nor necessarily impute a shar-
ing of common beliefs and values and practices at all. As if
building on this, Gutmann points out in her essay that "the
cultural heritage of black and nonblack Americans is neither
singular nor exclusive.""' Jazz, for example, is a reminder of
many shared parts of our various cultures, and "attachments
to cultures both change over time and vary among members
of identifiable groups in such a way that is belied by the
common notion of racial identity carrying a cultural identity
with it."
62
On this discussion about culture, Gutmann does not pro-
vide the reader with just a reminder of Appiah's point. She
paints a separate vision of color consciousness as a means not
only to expose the "fiction of race," but also to recognize that
"the cultural values that have been tied to the history of ra-
cial oppression are potentially open to all individuals, re-
gardless of their color."" Color consciousness, then, envisions
an "interactively multicultural" society by allowing individu-
als access to many cultural possibilities,64 yet recognize the
potential disparate impact that color may have on individu-
als' life chances. Moreover, the reader is left to absorb this
vision of society while remembering Appiah's words from
earlier in the book, that it is problematic to claim "jazz be-
longs to a black person who knows nothing about it more
fully or naturally than it does to a white jazzman.""
This intersection of ideas reveals the beauty of these
57. Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity, supra note 3, at 89.
58. Gutmann, supra note 1, at 175.
59. Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity, supra note 3, at 87.
60. Id. at 85.
61. Gutmann, supra note 1, at 167.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 167.
64. Id. at 175.
65. Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity, supra note 3, at 90.
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well-reasoned and comprehensive essays. So many facets of
the complex considerations of race weave together in each es-
say to form the proposed visions that the reader can pick out
individual strands of thought from each to find that their
threads in the other. The significance of culture on racial
discourse mentioned is just one example; the intersecting
ideas can be seen again, among other instances, in Appiah's
explanation that racial identification is a result of racism and
Gutmann's assertion that it is racist to force racial identifica-
tion on people who suffer the negative consequences of racial
ascriptions. This interplay I will leave future readers to dis-
cover for themselves.
Applying the Vision: Some Specific Contexts
That this review has focused primarily on the philo-
sophical and analytical content of the two essays should not
suggest that this book is reserved for critical race theorists or
scholars contemplating problematic implementation of demo-
cratic principles. This book is for everyone who is concerned
with racism and anything related to the problems of race.
The authors themselves utilize a number of specific contexts
to analyze the difficulties in responding to racism, among
them affirmative action (both in employment and in univer-
sity admissions), multiculturalism, immigration, and various
specific historical contexts. Numerous other specific debates
can benefit from application of the arguments and visions in
Color Conscious.
An examination of bilingual education programs, for ex-
ample, requires explorations of both ethnoracial group identi-
ties and linguistic categorization of individuals. Do bilingual
education programs aim to remedy English language profi-
ciency, or do they aim to correct ethnoracial injustice? Are
linguistic categorizations color blind? To what extent do lan-
guage, culture, and racial identity intertwine, and are they
separable? These are questions rooted in the same concerns
as those raised by Appiah and Gutmann; the application of
racial identity and color consciousness in the affirmative ac-
tion context can reflect in bilingual education as well.
Considerations of immigration and asylum laws and pro-
cedures will also raise similar concerns if one's focus is on re-
sponding to the social injustice in the application of American
immigration laws. Without diving into details, it is sufficient
6411998]
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to note that asylum applicants are not all treated equally,
nor are other immigrants, and racial differentiation lies the
not-so-latent cause. If color consciousness exposes the fiction
of race, will this impact application of immigration laws to-
ward greater social justice? How will the application of color
consciousness change immigration law?
These and many other potential application of their pro-
posals reveal the comprehensive and complex nature of Ap-
piah and Gutmann's works. It is perhaps, too, the nature of
the question: race is, after all, the problem of this century.
Toward a New Conversation
Perhaps the greatest value of the book lies behind its
contribution toward solving a problem poignantly summed
up by David Wilkins, "Not only are we are nation destined to
fail to solve the problem of the color-line in this century, but
we are in danger of losing our ability to even talk about the
subject intelligently.""' Indeed, as racially-based debates
such as affirmative action grow more pervasive, attacks from
both sides on their opponents have become increasingly dis-
tant from sound reasoning. One persuasive explanation for
this phenomena is that "even people intensely concerned
with affirmative action-whether for or against-rarely work
hard to understand the arguments on both sides and to fig-
ure out how to persuade others. Instead, we usually talk
about this difficult subject only with like-minded people and
avoid the subject with others." 7 Color Conscious confronts
complex questions behind the problem of race to offer reason,
to persuade, and, ultimately, to drive the discourse toward
finding a "vision of the future that, despite our differences,
we all can share.""
Solving the problem of race in America requires the en-
tire nation to face up to the challenges of its democratic prin-
ciples, "of living up to its best principles."69 Doing this, Gut-
mann and Appiah remind us, requires "citizens of every color
to play their part in America's long conversation about
66. Wilkins, supra note 5, at 3.
67. CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND AMERICAN VALUES 5 (1996).
68. Gutmann, supra note 1, at 178.
69. K Anthony Appiah, Epilogue, in K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN,
COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 179, 182 (1996).
[Vol. 38642
BOOKS RECEIVED
race."7° We would each do well to begin, continue, and enrich
our conversation by reading Color Conscious.
70. Id. at 183.
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